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PREVIEW; Cross v. Warren:
Can Injured Third-Parties Stack Liability Insurance?
Elliott McGill

The Montana Supreme Court Oral Argument is scheduled for
Friday, September 21, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. at the Red Lion Hotel in
Kalispell, Montana. Colin Gerstner is expected to argue on behalf of
the Appellants, and Susan Moriarty Miltko is expected to argue on
behalf of Appellees.
INTRODUCTION
This case concerns third-party motor vehicle liability
insurance and whether it can be “stacked” under Montana law.
Kenneth Cross, Henley Brady, and Roland Redfield (collectively
“Appellants”) sustained injuries in a motor vehicle collision.1 The
at-fault driver, Taylor Warren, was insured under a liability policy
issued by Progressive.2 The policy covering the truck Taylor was
driving at the time of the accident was covered under one of four
liability policies the Warren family purchased to cover their four
vehicles individually.3 The Appellants argue that each of the
Warrens’ four Progressive policies should be “stacked” to allow
recovery beyond the “per person” limit provided the individual
Progressive policy.4 Taylor Warren, his parents, and Progressive
(collectively “Appellees”) respond that Montana law prevents
stacking multiple third-party liability policies, and in the alternative,
even if stacking of the coverage is allowed, Progressive satisfied the
statutory requirements necessary to prevent Appellants from doing
so.5
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 8, 2015, Taylor Warren crashed his parents’
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, Cross v. Warren,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/9/368/url/321Z246_03WCC
VM23005BKE.pdf. (Mont. Feb. 7, 2018) (No. DA 17-0599).
2
Id.
3
Appellee’s Answer Brief, Cross v. Warren,
https://supremecourtdocket.mt.gov/APP/connector/8/367/url/321Z24D_040WF
TGRV0007EX.pdf. (Mont. Apr. 9, 2018) (No. DA 17-0599).
4
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2–3.
5
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 6–7.
1
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GMC pickup truck into Appellants’ vehicle, seriously injuring
them.6 Warren was insured through Progressive under policies held
by his parents, Robert and Sherle Warren.7 The liability policy
covering the Taylor’s GMC truck had “$100,000 per
person/$300,000 aggregate coverage limits,” as did three other
policies the Warrens purchased from Progressive to cover their
additional vehicles.8 The Warrens paid separate premiums for each
of the four policies.9 Progressive paid each injured Appellant
$100,000, the “per person” limit on the GMC policy, but it denied
Appellants’ request to stack the liability limits on all four
Progressive policies—stacking would have allowed Appellants to
recover $1,200,000 from Progressive.10
Progressive submitted rate filings to the Montana
Commissioner of Insurance in early 2011 which included the
information used by Progressive to determine the premiums for each
policy held by the Warrens.11 Appellants agree that Montana Code
Annotated § 33–23–203(1)(c) allows an insurer to prevent stacking
if it shows their premiums “actuarially reflect the limiting of
coverage separately to the vehicles covered by the policy,” but
argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the requirement in its
submitted filings.12 Additionally, Appellees point out that the
language of the GMC policy unambiguously and specifically
provides that the Warrens’ multiple policies cannot be stacked.13
The Twenty-Second Judicial District Court, Big Horn
County, granted Progressive’s motion for summary judgment.14 The
district court did not apply Section 33–23–203 in reaching its
decision,15 but nevertheless held that Montana law prohibits the
stacking of liability coverage.16 First, the court determined that firstparty automobile insurance policies which protect the policyholder
(e.g., Uninsured Motorist Coverage (UIM), Underinsured Motorist
Coverage (UM), and Medical Payments Coverage (MP)) are
inherently different from third-party coverages like the one issued
for Warren’s GMC.17 Second, the district court reasoned that under
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 2.
11
Id.
12
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29–30.
13
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 42.
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
15
Id.
16
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 2.
17
Id. at 19.
6
7
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Montana law, stacking is only available to named insureds on an
insurance policy.18 Third, the court decided that third-party liability
coverage is not “personal and portable” and is therefore not
stackable.19 The district court concluded that preventing thirdparties from stacking multiple liability policies does not render the
coverage illusory.20
The resolution of this case will likely hinge on the Montana
Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of Section 33–23–
203. The Montana Supreme Court must determine: 1) whether
Section 33–23–203 applies to third parties, and whether it requires
stacking or is merely applicable in stacking cases; and 2) whether
Progressive met the statutory filing requirements, thereby
permitting it to refuse to stack the policies.
II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellants’ Argument
Appellants argue that the district court erred by not applying
Section 33–23–203 in reaching its decision.21 They contend that
since its amendment in 2007, Section 33–23–203 has shifted from
an anti-stacking statute to a pro-stacking statute that no longer
differentiates between so-called first-party and third-party
coverages.22 Additionally, Appellants assert that modern liability
policies are “personal and portable,” so courts should no longer be
misled by “the so-called first-party/third-party distinction.”23
Appellants also argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the
filing requirements set forth by Section 33–23–203(1)(c).24 Section
33–23–203(1)(c) requires an insurer to file its rates with the
Commissioner of Insurance and requires the rates to “actuarily
reflect” the limiting of coverage to each separate vehicle covered by
a policy. Appellants contend that Progressive failed to satisfy both
requirements.25 First, Appellants assert that the rates cannot
actuarily reflect the limiting of coverage, because the Warrens’
liability coverage was not limited to specific covered autos under
their policies; instead, it was “personal and portable,” therefore
18

Id.
Id. at 20.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 23.
22
Id. at 27.
23
Id. at 26.
24
Id. at 27
25
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 29, 34.
19

51

MONTANA LAW REVIEW ONLINE

Vol. 79

preventing any actuarial reflection that the premiums paid were
limited to the specific automobiles in the Warrens’ policies.26
Otherwise, the liability coverage would be rendered illusory; the
Warrens paid valuable consideration for each of the policies and
should be entitled to stack the benefits of each.27 Second, Appellants
argue that Progressive failed to satisfy the filing requirements of the
statute, because it did not provide “actuarial certifications relative to
its bodily injury liability policies.”28
Finally, Appellants contend that the district court erred in
concluding that stacking is only available to parties who are
“insureds,” as defined in the GMC policy.29 Appellants concede that
they do not fit the policy’s definition of “insured,” but assert that
they should be entitled to stacking privileges nonetheless.30 Since
Taylor Warren was an “insured” under the Progressive policy, and
since Montana courts recognize instances where third-parties may
seek compensation directly from insureds (e.g., declaratory actions,
actions under the Unfair Trade Practices Act, etc.), Appellants argue
that they are entitled to stacking benefits.31
B. Appellee’s Argument
Appellees rebut the claim that Section 33–23–203 requires
stacking of any type of insurance coverage, much less liability
coverage.32 Even if the Court decides Section 33–23–203 can be
applied to third party liability coverage, Appellees argue that the
statute’s plain language does not require stacking.33 Additionally,
Appellees point to the legislative history of Section 33–23–203 to
support the notion that the Montana Legislature intended for the
statute to prevent stacking, not require it.34 Further, Appellees assert
that the absence of any stacking requirement under Section 33–23–
203 is consistent with the Legislature’s decision to set mandatory
stacking limits; holding otherwise would “effectively mandate”
excess liability coverage for any Montanan who owns more than one
vehicle.35
26

Id. at 33.
Id. at 31.
28
Id. at 35.
29
Id. at 35.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 42–43.
32
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 7.
33
Id. at 8.
34
Id. at 11.
35
Id. at 14.
27
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Second, Appellees argue that since Appellants are not
“insureds” under any of the Warrens’ policies, they had no
reasonable expectations that the Warrens would carry any coverage
beyond the minimum requirements set by Montana law.36 Appellees
respond to Appellants’ claim that stacking should be permitted due
to Taylor Warren’s status as an “insured” by pointing to evidence
that the Warrens themselves did not expect their multiple liability
policies to stack and, therefore, Taylor Warren’s “insured” status is
not grounds for stacking the policies.37
Third, Appellees argue that liability coverage cannot be
“personal and portable,” because it is tied to a specific vehicle or its
replacement and is required under Montana law.38 Additionally,
Appellees contend that the Warrens’ liability coverage is not
illusory, as demonstrated by the fact that Progressive paid $300,000
under the GMC policy—the maximum amount listed in the policy.39
Finally, Appellees assert that even if the Court holds that
Section 33–23–203 requires stacking of liability coverage,
Progressive met the statutory requirement to properly refuse
stacking.40 Appellees argue that the following facts demonstrate its
statutory compliance: 1) Progressive’s premiums actuarily reflect
the limiting of coverage to specific vehicles, because Progressive
does not include stacked exposure in its calculations of premiums;
2) Progressive filed the rates with the Commissioner of Insurance;
and 3) the policy language of the Warrens’ policies unambiguously
state that coverage is limited to each insured vehicle and cannot be
stacked.41
IV. ANALYSIS
A critical decision for the Montana Supreme Court is
whether Section 33–23–203 requires or allows stacking third-party
insurance coverage. Both parties agree that the current statute
embodies the Court’s holding in Hardy v. Progressive Specialty Ins.
Co.42 In Hardy, the Court applied the pre-2007 version of Section
33–23–203 to a case involving an injured first-party Plaintiff who
sought to stack his multiple UIM policies.43 Applying the then36

Id. at 23.
Id. at 25.
38
Id. at 29.
39
Id. at 34-35.
40
Id. at 35.
41
Id. at 35, 38, and 42.
42
2003 MT 85, 315 Mont. 107, 67 P.3d 892.
43
Id., ¶ 7.
37
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existing statute, which prohibited stacking completely, the Court
held that the statute as it existed was unconstitutional “to the extent
that it allows charging premiums for illusory coverage.”44 The
Court’s holding, followed by the Legislature’s codification of it in
the 2007 amendment to Section 33–23–203, seems to bolster
Appellees’ argument that only first-parties can stack multiple
policies under Montana law.45 If nothing else, Hardy seems to at
least require third-parties to prove liability coverages are illusory
before successfully stacking them. If the Court reads Hardy and the
statute to permit third parties to stack multiple liability policies, it
will adopt Appellants’ argument that the statute transformed from a
pre-Hardy stacking ban into a post-Hardy stacking requirement,
allowing insurers to deny coverage only as provided in Section 33–
23–203(1)(c).
If the Court holds that stacking of liability coverage is
available at all under Section 33–23–203, another critical
determination is whether Progressive met the requirements set by
Section 33–23–203(1)(c) in refusing to stack the Warrens’ four
policies. Progressive filed its premiums with the Commissioner of
Insurance and provided affidavits to prove that its calculations of
premiums were not based on stacked exposure.46 Therefore, the
Court must decide whether Progressive’s filings were sufficient, or
whether, as Appellants argue, insurers must provide additional
actuarial certification along with filings of their premiums on
liability coverages.47 A ruling in Appellants’ favor on this issue
would not only require insurers to file additional documents, but it
would also likely change the way rates are calculated. Permitting
stacking in this case would require insurers to consider stacking
exposure in calculating insurance rates—a consideration which
could ultimately lead to higher premiums for Montanans.
V. CONCLUSION
This case presents the Court with difficult legal questions
that implicate statewide economic and social policies. For
individuals, the Court’s decision will determine whether third
parties can stack multiple liability coverages to pay their medical
bills after injuries. For insurers, the Court will decide the scope of
stacking and whether insurers are able to limit exposure therefrom.
44

Id., ¶ 38.
Appellee’s Answer Brief, supra note 3, at 5.
46
Id. at 38.
47
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 35.
45

